City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

9-2019

Law and Society: The Criminalization of Latinx in the United
States
Gabriela Groenke
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3421
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

LAW AND SOCIETY:
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LATINX IN THE UNITED STATES

by

GABRIELA GROENKE

A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York

2019

© 2019
GABRIELA GROENKE
All Rights Reserved

ii

Law and Society:
The Criminalization of Latinx in the United States
by
Gabriela Groenke

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in
satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

_________________________
Date

_________________________
Leslie Paik
Thesis Advisor

_________________________
Date

_________________________
Elizabeth Macaulay-Lewis

Executive Officer

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

ABSTRACT

Law and Society:
The Criminalization of Latinx in the United States
by
Gabriela Groenke

Advisor: Leslie Paik
The United States leads the world in incarceration with just over 2.2 million people in
state or federal prisons or local jails in 2014 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2016). Although the
number of incarcerated individuals has declined by about .5 percent since its peak in 2008
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 2016), the fact remains that mass incarceration is an epidemic in the
United States. Over the last decade much has been written about the effects of mass incarceration
on people of color, with many analysts pointing to the fear of crime as contributing to the
formulation of current policies, which in turn produce racial and ethnic inequalities in the
American penal system (Morin 2009). For example, the “war on drugs” is often cited as the
greatest force behind the growth of the prison population and has largely targeted the Latinx and
African American communities, based on the misperception that they are responsible for a
majority of drug-related crimes (Morín 2009). That Latinx have historically been perceived as
criminals, drug-lords, and as particularly prone to violence has only increased support for
punitive policies and harsher sentences.
As the country’s largest racial and ethnic group and the fastest growing ethnic group
being imprisoned, it is important to examine the ways in which the Latinx community has been
impacted by the relationship between law and society in the U.S. Beginning with the
understanding that law is both constituted by and constitutes social relations; this thesis aims to
demonstrate the ways in which negative cultural stereotypes have been used to 1) create laws
that criminalize Latinx groups and 2) sanction their mistreatment in legal and non-legal settings.
By focusing on the specific time periods of the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, we can see that
negative images of Latinx groups perpetuated in the media are used strategically by
policymakers to rouse public outcry and garner support for harsher, more punitive criminal
justice and immigration policies for both adults and juveniles, contributing to higher
incarceration rates and mass deportation. Once validated and reinforced by official law, these
negative stereotypes then trickle down into non-legal social institutions.
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I.

Introduction
In 2015, Donald Trump began his Presidential campaign by declaring that Mexicans were

rapists, drug dealers, and criminals. In the two years since his inauguration, Donald Trump has
doubled down on his position against Mexico and Latin America, separating and detaining
families at the border, limiting those eligible to apply for asylum, attempting to shut down the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and even shutting down the federal
government over disputes of building a physical barrier between Mexico and the United States.
While the President’s rhetoric on Latinx immigrants has been unique in its frankness, he is not
the first president or politician to invoke the use of racial and ethnic stereotypes of Latinx groups
to garner support for tougher, more punitive policies on immigration, criminal justice, and even
education. The invocation of these stereotypes by the dominant group has proven to be an
effective tool in creating laws that are designed to both criminalize Latinx people and perpetuate
existing social and economic inequalities by reinforcing the collective perception of Latinx as
criminals.
The role of law in the U.S. has often served to perpetuate and reinforce the status quo,
marginalizing and subjugating different racial and ethnic groups throughout its history. With the
rise of mass incarceration, this tradition has exacerbated the criminalization of African
Americans and Latinx. Understanding mass incarceration through the complex economic and
social arrangements that fostered it requires examining not just laws and punitive policies, but
the society that created them. How do these laws get written, passed, and implemented? What is
the role of cultural views towards specific groups in that process? In particular, this thesis
explores the law’s impact on the way Latinx are perceived/treated and how these perceptions
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limit the opportunities for social and economic mobility available to Latinx groups –both within
and outside of legal settings.
One need only look to the racial and ethnic disparities in U.S. incarceration rates to
understand that Latinx people are being systematically criminalized. With just over 2.2 million
people in state or federal prisons or local jails at yearend 2014 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2016), the United States leads the world in incarceration. While much of the focus has been on
African Americans specifically, Latinx groups have also been routinely targeted by the American
legal system and are incarcerated at higher rates than whites. In 2017, the rate of imprisonment
for Latinx (823 per 100,000) was over three times that of whites (272 per 100,000) (Gramlich
2019). Moreover, Latinx represent the largest ethnic group of sentenced federal offenders at 48
percent in 2012 (Light, Lopez, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2014), nearly triple their share (16.7%) of
the population (U.S. Census 2012).
While the available data demonstrates an overrepresentation of Latinx in the criminal
justice system, inconsistencies in reporting of race and ethnicity across national, state and county
systems suggest an undercount of those in the system. For example, many data systems only
collect information on race, offering choices for “White,” African American,” and “Other” –
leaving out ethnic categories such as “Hispanic,” (Walker et al. 2004). With limited choices for
race, analysis of Census data reveals that more than 90% of Latinx reported their race as
“White,” which has often led to an overreporting of the number of “White” prisoners (Walker et
al. 2004). In 1997, for example, Holman (2001) found that the percentage of “White” prisoners
reported in Federal prison was 58%, while the actual number was slightly over 31% (cited in
Walker et al. 2004). In 8 out of the 10 states surveyed, the study found an overreporting of
Whites by as low as 6% and as high as 54% (Holman 2001 cited in Walker et al. 2004).
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Due to the inconsistencies in reporting, the available data should therefore be interpreted
as a conservative estimate. In fact, the true scale of Latinx in the criminal justice system is likely
much larger. Nevertheless, even by conservative estimates Latinx are overrepresented at every
stage of the criminal justice system. They are more likely than Whites to be arrested, detained
before trial, incarcerated in state and federal prisons and jails, given longer sentences when
convicted, and more likely to be on parole or probation (Walker et al. 2004). Because many
Latinx individuals are immigrants, both documented and undocumented, they are also more
likely to be arrested, detained and deported for immigration violations (Walker et al. 2004).
As the country’s largest racial and ethnic group and the fastest growing ethnic group
being imprisoned, it is important to examine the ways in which the Latinx community has been
impacted by the relationship between law and society in the U.S. Beginning with the
understanding that law is both constituted by and constitutes social relations; this thesis aims to
demonstrate the ways in which negative cultural stereotypes have been used to 1) create laws
that criminalize Latinx groups and 2) sanction their mistreatment in legal and non-legal settings.
By focusing on the specific time periods of the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, we can see that
negative images of Latinx groups perpetuated in the media are used strategically by
policymakers to rouse public outcry and garner support for harsher, more punitive criminal
justice and immigration policies for both adults and juveniles, contributing to higher
incarceration rates and mass deportation. Once validated and reinforced by official law, these
negative stereotypes then trickle down into non-legal social institutions. In schools, for example,
we see that Latinx youth are more likely to drop out of high school and less likely to attend
college, limiting their employment opportunities. They are also punished more severely than
their white peers and policed in such a way that makes their entrance into the criminal justice
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system almost inevitable. The system, made up of social and legal institutions, is designed in
such a way as to perpetuate the social and economic inequality of Latinx groups through laws,
customs and politics.
This thesis is organized as follows. It first discusses the longstanding stereotypes of
Latinx groups that serve to dehumanize and further marginalize them. It then turns to the ways in
which these stereotypes were strategically invoked by dominant groups, via political rhetoric and
news media coverage, to pass legislation and public policies that have contributed to the
expansion of the American penal system. In particular, this section will focus on the political
rhetoric and media coverage of crime and criminals leading up to the passing and
implementation of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Illegal Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; as
well as legislative initiatives such as Operation Tarmac, and Operation Streamline to name a few.
The section that follows will examine how said laws are enforced, highlighting the use of
stereotypes to inform police practices and discretionary decision making in criminal legal
proceedings. The next section discusses the role of stereotypes in the everyday interactions of
Latinx, particularly in schools, and the extent to which the law impacts the Latinx experience in
non-legal spaces. Finally, this thesis will conclude with the enduring legacy of these laws and
their impact on Latinx individuals today.

II.

The Social Construction of Latinx as “Other”: The Latinx Experience in the U.S.
The “Latin lover,” the “Drug lord,” the “hot-tempered, spicy Latina/o,” the lazy drunkard

who would prefer to “siesta” all day rather than work, the promiscuous and extremely fertile
Latina who burdens the State, the unintelligent Latina/o who is either incapable or unwilling to
learn English. These stereotypes, as well as others, have a long history in American culture. The
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social construction of Latinx people in the United States as “other” dates as far back as the
nineteenth century and has, historically, been strategically employed to justify U.S. laws and
policies having to do with Latin American immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants (Morín,
2009).
Characterized by Alfredo Mirandé (1987) as “gringo justice,” the U.S. has continuously
formulated policy around the subordination of their neighbors across the border (cited in Morín
2009). The belief that Americans were destined to expand and remake the west in their image
because of their racial, cultural and religious superiority provided the justification for the
Mexican-American War. By the end of the war, in 1848, Mexico had been reduced to
approximately half of its previous land-base, and the U.S. had succeeded in securing control over
its territory and its people (Morín 2009). Rather than granting Mexicans in conquered territories
U.S. citizenship and equal rights, they were characterized as “barbaric” and “inferior,”
undeserving of citizenship (Morín 2009). Similarly, Puerto Rico came under U.S. control in 1898
and was officially declared a territory of the United States in 1917, granting U.S. citizenship to
Puerto Ricans. However, to this day Puerto Ricans do not benefit from the full rights afforded to
American-born citizens under the U.S. Constitution. For example, Puerto Ricans cannot vote for
the President of the United States and have no voting representation in the U.S. Congress, nor
would they automatically have the right to a trial by jury (Morín 2009). While Puerto Ricans can
be called upon to serve and fight in U.S. wars, they are not considered “part” of the U.S. and are
relegated to a “second-class citizenship” (Morín 2009). The historical experiences of Mexicans
and Puerto Ricans, who would come to form the largest groups of the Latinx community, paved
the way for similar patterns of legal abuse and subordination of Latinx from other Latin
American countries; constructing a group identity and what it means to be a Latinx in the United
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States (Oquendo 1996; Morín 2009).
In his conceptualization of a Latinx “race,” Oquendo (1996) argues that there are two
aspects, or dimensions, that have come to shape a collective Latinx identity in the United States.
The first, he argues, is the historical experience, which he notes distinguishes the Latinx
community from all other immigrant communities in the United States. Citing first the colonial
expansion of the nineteenth-century and then “an analogous Twentieth Century neo-colonial
enterprise,” Oquendo (1996) argues that the Latinx community is a part of the United States not
by choice necessarily but due to similar patterns of conquest and subjugation. These historical
experiences set up the necessary conditions – political, social, and economic – that “made a
group of Latino(a)s part of the United States reality,” and paved the way for subsequent rounds
of migration (Oquendo 1996).
The second dimension critical to the shaping of a Latinx “race” is the Latinx
community’s ties to the Spanish language. While noting the complexities of this dimension, such
as the fact that not all Latinx speak Spanish, Oquendo (1996) argues that all Latinx have some
relationship to Spanish that affects how they perceive themselves and how others perceive them.
Citing the use of the derogatory term “spik” for all Latinx groups, which focuses on the way
Latinx speak, it is clear that language has played a crucial role in shaping the Latinx identity and
how dominant groups respond to it (Oquendo 1996). To that end, the concept of a Latinx identity
is useful in its application to Law and Society research in that it allows for patterns of
discrimination and legal subordination to be more easily identified and understood within this
context.
Recognizing the historical need for certain defined legal and subordinating relationships
allows for a better understanding of why negative perceptions of Latinx are created, reinforced,
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and perpetuated, and how these perceptions shape their subsequent treatment. As Armenta (2017:
6) points out, “ideas about race shape anti-immigrant legislation, and laws produce racial
inequality, foster racial stereotypes, and imbue legal categories with racial meanings.” Chavez’s
“Latino Threat Narrative” suggests that this has been particularly true for Latinx immigrants in
the United States. He notes that while previous immigrant groups were eventually accepted into
the American collective, such as the Irish and Italians, Latinx immigrants are generally perceived
as either unwilling or unable to assimilate, making them a cultural threat to the nation
(Timberlake et al. 2015). While the characterization of Mexicans as “barbaric” and “inferior”
justified colonial expansion, the social and legal construction of Latinx as criminally inclined
played a vital role in controlling the newly acquired population through legislation.
The Anti-Vagrancy Act of 1855, more commonly known as the “Greaser Act,” was an
anti-vagrancy law that defined vagrants as “all persons who are commonly known as ‘Greasers’
or the issue [children] of Spanish and Indian blood” (Morín 2009, 21). At the time, the term
greaser referred to anyone of Mexican appearance in California and the Southwest, stemming
from either the practice of Mexican laborers greasing their backs to facilitate the unloading of
hides and cargo, the similarity between Mexican skin color and grease, or the general conception
of Mexicans as unclean with dirty, greasy black hair (Bender 2003). Under the Greaser Act,
those suspected of vagrancy, as defined by the law, were arrested and were either deported or
sent to forced labor. It also legalized the confiscation of their property and the lynching of
“recalcitrant individuals” (Heidenreic 2015). The Greaser Act is one of the earlier examples of
the criminalization of Latinx through U.S. law and would continue to shape the perception of
Latinx for years to come.
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III.

Political Rhetoric and the Law: How Perceptions of Latinx Inform Legislation
That Latinx have historically been perceived as criminals, drug-lords, and as particularly

prone to violence has only increased support for punitive policies and harsher sentences, as
reflected in the growth of Latinx in the criminal justice system. While politicians and public
officials have a vested interest in the social construction of Latinx as criminally inclined,
evidence suggests that the media also plays a crucial role in promoting and perpetuating negative
stereotypes of Latinx (Reinarman and Levine 1997; Beckett and Sasson 2004). In 1871, for
example, a Texas newspaper wrote about the perceived lack of sanitation among Mexicans,
suggesting that they kept their hogs in the house and even equating them with the animals
writing, “…from the similarity it was hard to tell where the hogs left off and inhabitants began”
(Bender 2003, 115). The undisguised racial animus expressed in this article was characteristic of
the time, reflecting and perpetuating popular sentiments.
Larson (2006) emphasizes the power of news media to help readers and viewers
“develop, reinforce, or challenge assumptions about race,” by using a variety of techniques to
shape news. While racial stereotypes tend to be thought of as crude or explicit, they are often
conveyed more subtly in news stories through story selection, the types of stories that feature
people of color, or in the phrasing of headlines and sentences (Larson 2006 citing Dashiell
1996). To that end, when racial minorities are the subjects of hard news, most often in crime
stories, the focus is on the threat they pose to the social structure and their opposition to whites
(Larson 2006). Conversely, soft news coverage of racial minorities tends to highlight their
“otherness” by focusing on colorful festivals, celebrations, rituals, and clothing, which ultimately
trivializes them by “demonstrating how ‘different’ they are” (Larson 2006).
In addition to the types of news stories about people of color, news media often depict
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only two types of racial minorities – the “good” and the “bad” – reinforcing American ideals.
Upper- and middle-class racial minorities, the “good” type, are held up as the epitome of the
American Dream, having overcome their circumstances through hard work and determination
(Larson 2006). These individuals demonstrate that “discrimination is a thing of the past” (Larson
2006). On the other hand, “bad” minorities – poor people, protestors, and criminals – are
portrayed as victims of their own making and pose a threat to society (Larson 2006). The
emphasis on individual behavior to explain success or failure serves to dispel the notion of an
inherently flawed system, built on racism, that works to preserve the status quo.
News coverage of the Latinx community in Los Angeles in the early 1940s demonstrates
the impact of story selection, language and the depiction of Latinx as “bad” minorities on public
attitudes and behaviors toward Latinx. Local newspapers’ constant use of racially inflammatory
language to sensationalize crime among the Latinx community and highlight their “otherness”
largely incited the anti-Mexican sentiment that culminated in the Zoot Suit Riots of 1943. With
headlines referring to “Mexican goon squads,” and “pachuco killers,” the media cited zoot suits
as further proof of Mexicans’ unwillingness to assimilate and to adopt American styles of dress
and culture. Charged with a patriotism that was characteristic of the time and bolstered by reports
of increased violence and crime, white off-duty servicemen sought out and assaulted Latinx
youth dressed in zoot suits in the barrios of Los Angeles, starting riots in Los Angeles as well as
other major cities around the country (Bender 2003).
The characterization of Latinx as criminals and as unwilling to assimilate justified their
punishment at the hands of vigilantes, just as their inherent “inferiority” had justified their
subordination in 1848. As demonstrated by public opinion polls and studies of the time, many
Americans shared these views. For example, a public opinion poll in 1940 and a study of
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American attitudes in 1949 revealed a significant number of Americans believed Latinx to be
“quick-tempered,” “lazy,” “ignorant,” “suspicious,” “unintelligent,” and “promiscuous” among
other things (Bender 2003, 12). These characterizations lead to larger societal issues, namely the
perceived “problem” of immigration and the association of immigrant status with criminality.
By the 1960s, the issue of crime in America dominated political rhetoric, shaping the
public’s perception of the crime issue in America and calling for measures to combat it.
Politicians relied on the media to highlight “street crime” and used it to amplify its message that
crime and violence were the results of immoral individuals encouraged by excessively lenient
welfare and criminal justice systems (Beckett and Sasson 2004). While the rhetoric seemed raceneutral, focusing on crime and drugs as important issues that needed to be addressed to keep the
public safe, race relations and racist sentiments lay at the heart of these discussions. In order to
contain and control communities of color through public policy, politicians invoked longstanding
stereotypes of African Americans and Latinx as violent criminals through coded political rhetoric
and media representations of crime that focused, almost exclusively, on communities of color.
Thus, as Beckett and Sasson (2004) argue, “the war on crime and drugs is the consequence of
political efforts to shift perception of and policy regarding a variety of social problems—
including crime, addiction, and poverty—toward harsher, more repressive solutions.” This same
political strategy would later be used to exploit the war on terror, which would have a
detrimental effect on the incarceration and deportation of Latinx.

From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs
While the politicization of crime and the perception of people of color as inherently
criminal has a long history in the U.S. (see Muhammad 2010 and Murakawa 2008), it reached
national levels in the 1960s as a response by conservative politicians to the civil rights movement
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and the expansion of War on Poverty programs (Beckett and Sasson 2004). In an attempt to steer
state policy away from social welfare programs and toward social control, political leaders
sought to frame crime-related issues as the result of a lenient criminal justice system and an
overly supportive welfare system. Seeking to discredit the civil rights movement and its leaders,
southern officials mobilized the law and order discourse, framing civil protests as criminal rather
than political. Those who challenged segregation were labeled “hoodlums” and “lawbreakers”
(Beckett and Sasson 2004). At the same time, conservative politicians who were intent on
curtailing government spending on welfare programs sought to reframe the issue of crime in
America as the result of individual behavior rather than poverty itself. Where Great Society
programs sought to ameliorate poverty and, by extension, crime, the law and order discourse
helped to establish a new “war on crime” that could only be resolved through more punitive
measures.
By 1964, the law and order discourse had gained national prominence when Republican
presidential candidate Barry Goldwater made it the central issue of his campaign, citing the
“abuse of law and order” as a country-wide issue (Beckett and Sasson 2004). In heightening the
fear of crime and highlighting crime rates among the urban poor, who were predominantly
African American and Latinx, GOP leaders sought to appeal to white voters who were opposed
to racial reform. Thus, the law and order discourse “provided a means by which a number of
preexisting fears and concerns—about the pace and nature of social change, as well as the means
used in an attempt to bring this change about—were tapped, organized, and given expression”
(Beckett and Sasson 2004). In this way, it is clear that while political rhetoric does have the
power to shape public perception around social issues, it must be expressed under the right social
conditions and to an audience that is already predisposed to its message. How that rhetoric then
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translates into policy is best exemplified by the initiatives that came out of the war on drugs and,
later, the war on terror.
As a presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan renewed the law and order discourse and put
the issue of crime back in the national spotlight, promising to enhance measures to combat
“crime in the streets” (Beckett and Sasson 2004). Once elected, Reagan sought to circumvent the
federal government’s lack of authority over criminal law enforcement by focusing on “drugs as a
crucial cause of crime,” as Nixon had before him (Beckett and Sasson 2004). In order to enlist
support for federal changes from lawmakers, the issue of drugs had to be of national concern to
the American public. Public opinion polls of the early 1980s, however, indicate that the issue of
drugs as a precursor to crime, necessitating tougher law enforcement, was not widely supported
by the American public. By 1981, for example, only 3% of the American public believed that a
reduction of the drug supply would lead to lower crime rates (Beckett and Sasson 2004). The
administration and public officials turned to the media to change this. As described by Robert
Stutman, Director of the DEA office in New York City, the role of the media was key:
In order to convince Washington, I needed to make it [drugs] a national issue and
quickly. I began a lobbying effort and I used the media. The media were only too
willing to cooperate, because as far as the New York media [were] concerned, crack
was the hottest combat reporting story to come along since the end of the Vietnam
war (Beckett and Sasson 2004, 63 citing Stutman 1992).
News media played an instrumental role in establishing a “moral panic;” cultivating public fear
around the issue of drugs and tapping into unacknowledged racism by perpetuating racial
stereotypes.
Political efforts to employ the use of the media in the war on drugs were largely
successful. After the highly publicized cocaine-related deaths of two celebrity athletes, news
coverage of crack cocaine skyrocketed in the latter half of 1986 and focused primarily on poor
African Americans and Latinx (Reinarman and Levine 1997; Beckett and Sasson 2004). The
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crack “epidemic” became a nightly news event for major TV networks, generating high ratings
and advertising dollars, and was covered extensively by print media as well (Reinarman and
Levine 1997). Although crack was largely contained in impoverished urban areas that were
predominantly African American or Latinx, or likely because of that, it was portrayed as a
nation-wide issue. As Reinarman and Levine (1997) point out, there was little to no political or
media coverage when cocaine use, in its powder form, among middle- and upper-class whites
rose sharply in the late 1970s. The message about crack, however, was clear: it was a danger to
Americans everywhere, and something had to be done about the criminals who used and sold it.
Prominent political leaders, led by the Reagan administration, heard this call to action
and antidrug legislation soon followed in both the House and the Senate, culminating in the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986, which was later amended in 1988. Among other things, the Act
increased federal spending on antidrug efforts and assigned the military to aid in the control of
narcotics (Beckett and Sasson 2004). Most importantly, however, were the sentencing statutes
imposed by the Act. The Act set forth mandatory minimum sentences that differentiated between
two forms of cocaine: powder and crack, imposing more severe penalties for crack offenses.
For example, under the Act, trafficking of 5 grams or more of crack cocaine triggers a
five-year mandatory minimum sentence for first-time offenders. Conversely, trafficking of 500
grams or more of powder cocaine triggers the same sentence for first-time offenders (United
States Sentencing Commission 1995). In addition, the Act made crack cocaine the only drug to
trigger a mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession. Possession of any other substance,
of any quantity, by a first-time offender is classified as a misdemeanor and carries a maximum
sentence of one year (United States Sentencing Commission 1995). The consequences of this
law, as well as subsequent anti-crime legislation, would lead to the dramatic expansion of the
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American penal system and would significantly contribute to the racial and ethnic disparities of
its prisoners.
Since 1980, the number of individuals incarcerated for drug offenses went from 40,900 to
452,900 by 2017 (The Sentencing Project 2018). Between 1995 and 2001 alone, the U.S.
Department of Justice attributed the 61% growth in the number of prison inmates in the federal
system largely to the increase in the number of drug offenders, which accounted for 48% of the
total growth (Walker et al. 2004). As historically perceived “drug-lords” and “narco-traffickers,”
Latinx have been routinely targeted for drug arrests and convictions. By yearend 2015, almost
half of all prisoners sentenced in federal prisons were convicted for drug offenses. Of the total
number of prisoners sentenced for drug offenses, 38% were Latinx – just over twice their share
of the population (Carson and Anderson 2016; U.S. Census 2015).
Rather than neutralizing the war on drugs, the Drug Abuse Act seems to have galvanized
political efforts to take it further. In President Bush’s first nationally televised address in
September 1989, for example, he focused exclusively on the drug crisis and mapped out his plan
to combat it (Reinarman and Levine 1997; Beckett and Sasson 2004). During this address, Bush
held up a bag of crack and claimed that it was “seized” in a park across the street from the White
House, in order to demonstrate how widespread the drug trade had become (Reinarman and
Levine 1997). The truth, however, was that federal drug agents had a difficult time finding
anyone selling crack in the area and had to get creative in order to do so (Reinarman and Levine
1997). Nevertheless, the prop used by the President had the desired effect. Shortly after this
address, 64% of those polled by the New York Times/CBS News identified drugs as the most
important problem in America (Reinarman and Levine 1997), when only 1% had held that
opinion in January 1985 (Reinarman and Levine 1997). Evidently, intentionally misleading the
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public was a necessary evil in the quest for the social and legal subordination of racialized
“others.”
By the time President Clinton took office in 1993, political rhetoric had shifted yet again
from being drugs-centered to focusing on crime in general and violent crime in particular. As a
presidential candidate, Clinton adopted the tough-on-crime strategy that proved successful for his
GOP predecessors. He supported tougher penalties for drug offensives, police expansion efforts,
and aggressive border control measures (Beckett and Sasson 2004). Once elected, Clinton helped
pass some of the toughest crime policies to date, resulting in the largest increases in federal and
state prison inmates of any other president (The Justice Policy Institute 2001). By the end of his
presidency, the federal incarceration rate under Clinton was 42 per 100,000, which was more
than double that of Reagan’s (17 per 100,000) and 61% higher than at the end of Bush’s term (25
per 100,000) (The Justice Policy Institute 2001). Over 50% of these inmates were serving time
for drug-offenses (The Justice Policy Institute 2001).
Although the rate of violent crime in the United States had begun to decline by 1992,
Republicans and Democrats alike began introducing anticrime legislation in August 1993,
differing only in their positions on gun control, crime prevention programs, and the use of
federal aid to local law enforcement (Beckett and Sasson 2004). As was the case at the start of
the drug war, the American public was not particularly concerned with crime before the
campaign for anticrime legislation began, with only 9% of those polled in June 1993 feeling as
though crime was the most important issue in America (Public Opinion Survey 1994). By
October of that same year, however, that number increased to 22% and then to 32% by January
1994 (Public Opinion Survey 1994). While the publicity surrounding the proposed anticrime
legislation likely influenced this shift in public perception, news coverage of crime played an
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important role as well.
Between 1993 and 1994, newspaper and television coverage of violent crime increased
by more than 400% (Beckett and Sasson 2004 citing Chiricos, Eschholz, and Gertz 1997). Crime
stories dominated nightly newscasts on major news networks such as ABC, NBC, and CBS
between 1990 and 1999 (Beckett and Sasson 2004); and although the homicide rate had declined
by 33% between 1990 and 1998, network news coverage of homicide increased by 473%
(Beckett and Sasson 2004 citing Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001, p. 10).
Once again, the use of the media proved effective in the war on crime efforts. By 1994,
Democrats and Republicans settled on the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. In
addition to authorizing billions of dollars for crime prevention, law enforcement and state prison
construction (Beckett and Sasson 2004), the law imposed even harsher sentencing statutes and
encouraged states to increase the use of incarceration (Sabol et al. 2002). For example, the “three
strikes” provision, an adaptation of California’s state law, mandated life sentences for three-time
federal offenders (Hurwitz and Peffley 2010); while the “truth in sentencing” program granted
federal funds to states that implemented laws requiring convicted violent offenders to serve no
less than 85% of their sentence (Sabol et al. 2002). Clearly an excessively punitive policy,
Clinton succeeded in wresting the tough-on-crime platform away from the GOP and made it his
own.

From the War on Drugs to Crimmigration
While the “war on drugs” is often cited as the greatest force behind the growth of the
prison population, targeting the African American and Latinx communities, the convergence of
criminal and immigration law, or “crimmigration” as it is now referred to, has played a crucial
role in the incarceration of Latinx specifically. In fact, the criminal justice system has become
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the primary means for identifying, detaining and deporting immigrants – documented and
undocumented alike.
The political rhetoric on the war on crime, revitalized by the Reagan administration in the
drug war and invoked by politicians thereafter, was not confined to the issue of drugs that
targeted African American and U.S.-born Latinx communities. Reagan also took a law and order
approach to immigration, implementing policies that prohibited, detained, and deported refugees
seeking asylum (Macías-Rojas 2018). Beginning in the early 1980s, the United States and other
industrialized countries saw an increase in the number of asylum seekers from Cuba, El
Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua, among other countries (Macías-Rojas 2018). While the United
States has, historically, vacillated between restrictive and loose immigration policies, the
Refugee Act of 1980 demonstrated an alignment of U.S. immigration law with international
human rights law (Macías-Rojas 2018). An influx of refugees seeking safety and fleeing civil
wars, however, shifted the political narrative. Suddenly, Cuban and Haitian refugees were
depicted as “criminals” and “dangerous classes” and public concerns over immigrants and
immigration grew (Macías-Rojas 2018).
In 1982, 84 percent of the public expressed concerns about the number of “illegal aliens”
in the country (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). By 1984, the Reagan administration began to
frame unauthorized immigration as a national security issue, stating “The simple truth is that
we’ve lost control of our borders and no nation can do that to survive” (Nevins 2010, 55 citing
Morganthau 1984). Public opinion continued to support these views, as demonstrated by a 1990
Roper poll in which more than three-fourths of those surveyed believed that U.S. immigration
levels should not be increased and nearly one-half felt that it should be lowered (Espenshade and
Calhoun 1993). This would lead not only to punitive legislation in immigration but would also
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include immigrants as targets in the war on drugs.
The first instance of legislation that specifically targeted immigrants in the drug war was
in the aforementioned Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. In addition to the provisions already noted,
the law expanded grounds for deportation, making drug convictions a deportable offense for
noncitizens (Macías-Rojas 2018). It also established pilot programs that enhanced the
communication and information exchange between the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and state and local law enforcement (Macías-Rojas 2018). Following the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) included a similar provision that
further expanded grounds for deportation. The act included funding for an “Alien Criminal
Apprehension Program,” which sought to deport immigrants in the criminal justice system after
completing their sentences (Macías-Rojas 2018). Not satisfied with the deportation provisions set
forth under the two acts, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was later amended in 1988 to include a new
“aggravated felony” category (Macías-Rojas 2018). At the time, the term “aggravated felony”
referred to convictions for murder and illicit drug and firearms trafficking as deportable offenses
(Macías-Rojas 2018). Today, however, there are over 30 types of crimes that are considered
“aggravated felonies,” including minor infractions, that would not be classified as felonies for
citizens. Although Reagan’s immigrant detention and deportation policies were largely contested
by civil rights groups, the immigration provisions set forth under these criminal justice policies
paved the way for a renewed discourse on immigration and criminality.
The presence of a growing immigrant population in the 1990s generated heated debates
over immigrant rights and immigration policies throughout the country. Many anti-immigrant
advocates argued for a zero-tolerance policy in which even the most basic rights were denied.
They argued that basic rights for immigrants would lead to additional rights claims and would
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only encourage “further rounds of immigration” (Nicholls 2013, 24). While crime-centered
political rhetoric initially focused largely on the war on drugs and targeted U.S.-born
communities of color, immigrants were rounded up and deported after being convicted of drug
crimes largely because of prison overcrowding (Macías-Rojas 2018). In the early 1990s,
however, Democrats shifted their position on unauthorized migration and began campaigning for
tougher immigration laws, including making unauthorized border crossings a criminal offense
(Macías-Rojas 2018).
As it had during the drug war, national reporting of the “Latino threat” helped shape
public perception on immigration and encouraged support for stricter policies. Between 1992 and
1994 alone, eighteen magazine covers were devoted to the topic of immigration (Chavez 2001).
The Time’s 9 April 1990 cover is particularly revealing in both its text and imagery. The cover
depicted an American flag with black, brown, and yellow stripes standing in for the traditional
red, white and blue. While still present, the color white had been “squeezed out” and was
practically nonexistent; its meaning unambiguous and made explicit by the accompanying text:
“America’s Changing Colors: What will the U.S. be like when whites are no longer the
majority?” (Chavez 2001, 137). As one of the articles in the issue stated, “The ‘browning of
America’ will alter everything in society, from politics and education to industry, values and
culture,” (Chavez 2001, 137). The article implied that the demographic changes America was
undergoing would change the way White Americans saw themselves, as they were generally
“accustomed to thinking of themselves as the very picture of their nation” (Chavez 2001, 138).
While the article did not explicitly argue for or against immigration reform, it no doubt played on
White Americans’ fear of becoming a minority in “their own nation.”
Magazine covers and articles continued to focus on immigration and demographic shifts
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in the early 1990s. The New Republic chose to focus on racial tensions between Latinx
immigrants and African Americans in 1991, after an African American police officer shot and
killed a Salvadoran immigrant in a neighborhood park; while others depicted the state at the
border as a crisis that threatened the nation (Chavez 2001). The cover of the May 1992 issue of
the Atlantic Monthly, for example, read: “The Border: In the tense, hybrid world along the U.S.Mexico border, Mexico’s problems are becoming America’s problems.” (Chavez 2001, 145). In
August of 1993, Newsweek put an image of a drowning Statue of Liberty on its cover with text
that read: “Immigration Backlash: A Newsweek poll: 60% of Americans say immigration is ‘bad
for the country.’” (Chavez 2001, 161). In fact, a September 1993 Gallup Poll found that three out
of ten Americans listed “illegal immigration” as the country’s most important problem (Nevins
2010 citing McDonald 1997).
As more and more Americans were beginning to view immigration as a threat to the
nation, the magazine covers grew more hostile. The cover of American Heritage’s March issue
of 1994, for example, featured yet another image of the Statue of Liberty, but instead of holding
a torch, the image had been altered to depict her pointing away. The text of the cover
underscored the gesture: “Go Back Where You Came From: Since the very beginning, many
Americans have wanted this to be our immigration policy. Is it starting to happen?” (Chavez
2001, 175). As the debates over immigration intensified in the media, political debates over
immigration reform were no less intense.
Democrats and Republicans alike blamed undocumented immigrants for “crowding”
social institutions, such as schools and hospitals, as well as the labor market, and American
taxpayers were portrayed as the victims of this overcrowding (Macías-Rojas 2018). In doing so,
they garnered support for equally punitive federal and state-level anti-immigration laws.
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Although immigration authority generally lies with the federal government, states have the
authority to pass legislation restricting immigrants’ rights, access to social institutions and
government assistance. Because congressional leaders and local politicians also have the power
to shape public perception and policy, it is important to examine the immigration issues
developing at the state and local levels around this time to assess their impact on the federal
immigration policies that came out of the 1990s.
In California, for example, the immigrant issue was strategically exploited to explain the
economic recession. In an effort to win his reelection, Governor Pete Wilson lashed out at
immigrants and blamed them for the state’s economic problems. As described by Santa Ana
(2002, 6),
Wilson claimed that federal mandates to educate the children of illegal immigrants
and provide these families emergency health care accounted for $1.75 billion of
California’s debt. The ‘perverse incentives’ that Wilson proposed to abolish
included those arising from federal laws that mandate public education and health
services for immigrant families, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, which grants citizenship to children born in the United States,
regardless of the status of their parents. This baldly nativist rhetoric won Wilson
roars of approval from recession-weary voters. Immigration became an emotionally
charged political issue, as it had been in other recessionary times, and the mood of
the dominant constituencies of California political life became perceptively
negative toward Latinos.
Public outrage ensued and anti-Latinx sentiments were no longer confined to private discussions.
Anti-Latinx legislation soon followed and Proposition 187 was received by the general public
with open arms. Commonly known as the “Save Our State (SOS) initiative,” Proposition 187
sought to deny undocumented immigrants the right to social services and undocumented children
the right to attend primary and secondary schools (Nicholls 2013). Despite being “certifiably
unconstitutional,” the proposition was approved, and Pete Wilson was reelected in November of
1994 (Santa Ana 2002, 6).
Relying on the perceived threat of immigrants as competitors for economic resources,
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Wilson used welfare tropes and the association of immigrants as “illegals” to garner public
support for himself and for harsher state policies. Wilson’s anti-Latinx message resonated so
deeply with the public because it connected to long-held beliefs that had otherwise been dormant
while economic conditions had been stable. Although the crime rate in California had declined
and a majority of immigrants in California were documented and lawfully present, Wilson
highlighted immigrants as a burden on taxpayers and cited their overrepresentation in prisons as
evidence of that burden (Macías-Rojas 2018). Rather than addressing the punitive criminal
policies responsible for prison overcrowding, immigrants and Latinx immigrants in particular
were depicted as criminals and thus unworthy of the social benefits and the constitutional rights
afforded to “real” Americans. As Hagan and Palloni (1999) argue, the government and the media
have the power to perpetuate and reinforce stereotypes and misperceptions of Latin American
immigrants by reporting on the growing number of Latinx in prison, which obscure the policies
and practices that increase incarceration rates in the first place. Wilson’s decision to focus his
campaign on immigrants, often linking them with criminality, proved to be an effective strategy.
His re-election demonstrates an acceptance of the rhetoric and reflects the anti-immigrant
sentiment held by many in California at the time.
At the national level, the convergence crime politics and immigration began to recast
immigration as a criminal matter. Perhaps encouraged by Governor Wilson’s success, candidates
in the 1996 Presidential election also highlighted the immigration “problem” and promised to put
an end to it. The media continued to add fuel to the immigrant fire by using divisive language to
exacerbate the fear over the impact of immigration on society. The Wall Street Journal, for
example, published an article titled, “Backlash Over Immigration Has Entered Mainstream This
Year,” in which it noted the public’s concern over a “fraying of the social order” (Hagan and

22

Palloni 1999, 618). That same year, Congress increased the budget of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and the growing concern over the issue of “illegals” and their
threat to society lead to the implementation of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA).
After the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995, legislators seized the opportunity to
pass anti-terrorism legislation that targeted “alien terrorists” and included measures “aimed at
deporting and denying asylum to immigrants with membership in designated ‘terrorist
organizations.’” (Macías-Rojas 2018, 9). While acknowledging that the Oklahoma City bombing
was caused by “our own people,” legislators used the event to mobilize national security rhetoric
and garner support for AEDPA, which was signed into law on April 24, 1996 (Macías-Rojas
2018). Although the bill’s “counterterrorism” measures targeted Arab and Muslim immigrant
communities in the U.S., the domestic crime provisions in the bill, such as restrictions on habeas
corpus in death penalty cases, disproportionately impacted Blacks and Latinx in the criminal
justice system; while the “criminal alien deportation” provisions that sought to expedite
deportation proceedings mostly affected Latin American and Caribbean immigrants (MacíasRojas 2018). Because of the affect AEDPA had on legal permanent residents and asylum
seekers, debates over immigration continued and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) soon followed.
In addition to allocating more funding for border protection, IIRIRA expanded “zero
tolerance” approaches to “immigration reform” and ultimately lead to the increased involvement
of immigrants in the criminal justice system (Macías-Rojas 2018, 13). While IIRIRA was an
immigration bill, it was shaped by crime politics and the law and order discourse that had
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dominated political rhetoric since the 1960s. IIRIRA further expanded grounds for deportation
and added convictions “accompanied by a sentence of one year or longer” to the already
expanded list of “aggravated felonies” (Macías-Rojas 2018, 13 citing Osuna 1996 and Smith and
Grant 1996). It also provided funding for criminal enforcement priorities, mandatory detention of
“aliens” with orders of removal, fast-tracked deportation, and authorized the formal cooperation
of state and local law enforcement personnel in federal immigration enforcement under the
287(g) program (Macías-Rojas 2018). This law, and the 287(g) program in particular, would
have a profound impact on the convergence of criminal justice and immigration, and
significantly increased the incarceration and deportation of Latinx immigrants.
The effort to target “criminal aliens” was bipartisan and was characterized as necessary to
ensure the safety of the American public. Lamar Smith, a Republican Representative from Texas,
and Edward Grant drew on crime rhetoric to link immigration with crime, writing:
When immigration is accompanied by lawlessness, the American people suffer
through loss of life, health and property. In addition, when accompanied by crime,
immigration comes to be seen not as a source of pride and renewal for all Americans
but as a contributor to our problems. In the end, therefore, it is the immigrants
themselves who pay for our failure to be decisive in our treatment of criminal aliens
(Macías-Rojas 2018, 12 citing Smith and Grant 1996, 963)
While noting that a vast majority of legal immigrants were law-abiding, and that even “illegal”
immigrants commit mostly immigration-related offenses, they still emphasized the association of
immigrants and criminality in their justification for punitive immigration policies. The war on
crime had expanded to include immigration policies and would continue to expand with the war
on terror.
While the fear of terrorism was a reality most Americans were grappling with after the
attacks on 9/11, the long history of unequal and unjust treatment of Latinx within the criminal
justice system would indicate that terrorism was incidental. The primary agenda was border
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control and the subordination of those who managed to get past the border. The political climate
of post-9/11 America was one that, according to Nicholls (2013, 35),
…encouraged the enactment of increasingly repressive measures. Between 2001
and 2005 three new restrictive immigration laws were passed by Congress, and six
different operations were initiated by Homeland Security… The discursive
coupling of immigration and terrorism played an instrumental role in driving
restrictive immigration policies and directing them disproportionately at Mexican
immigrants.
Although the war on terror has always focused on and targeted Arab Americans and Muslims,
the long association of Latinx with violence and criminality has made the Latinx community an
easy, secondary target of the war on terror. As Bender (2002, 1154) argues, “Given their societal
construction as violent, foreign, criminal-minded, disloyal, and as overrunning the border, there
are numerous grounds by which Americans might similarly construct Latinas/os as a terrorist
threat.” More specifically, the association of Latinx with drugs and gang activity, “could shape a
conception of Latinas/os as ‘narco-terrorists,’” (Bender 2002, 1155).
Public officials encouraged this conception by highlighting the link between drugs and
terrorist activity. Congressman Mark Souder (R-IL), for example, stated that “Americans who
buy and sell illegal narcotics are lending a helping hand to people like those who attacked
American on September 11” (Bender 2002, 1155). In citing the production of heroin in
Afghanistan, whose proceeds helped fund al-Qaeda terrorist campaigns, government officials
were able to further justify policing measures and military intervention in the national and
international war on drugs (Bender 2002). Under this pretense, the federal government launched
Operation Tarmac in 2002, which primarily targeted undocumented airport workers, most of
whom were Latinx, with access to restricted areas such as flight meal kitchens, runways and
airplanes (Bender 2002). “Illegals,” however, were not the only targets. As Bender (2002, 1162)
points out, “Congress imposed a citizenship requirement on airport screeners, a substantial
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number of which are non-citizen Latinas/os.” In support of this initiative, an anti-immigrant
group in Utah justified these tactics by denouncing Mexican airport employees as disloyal to
America and thus easily susceptible to bribes from “Arab” terrorists to plant weapons on planes
(Bender 2002).
Congress continued to demonstrate its commitment to the criminalization of immigrants
through the merging of the criminal justice system and immigration enforcement bureaucracies;
which, until the 1990s, seldom coordinated with one another (Gottschalk 2015). In 2003,
Congress established the Department of Homeland Securities (DHS), replacing the Immigration
and Naturalization Services (INS) agency with three new entities: U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (Department of Homeland Securities 2019). Under the
DHS, ICE and Border Patrol have initiated their own programs aimed at apprehending and
removing undocumented immigrants, often with the help of state and local law enforcement
agencies. The DHS and the Justice Department have also made this partnership more formal
through joint initiatives aimed at capturing, incarcerating and then deporting undocumented
immigrants.
The criminal and immigration policies that came out of the 1980s,1990s and early 2000s
were endorsed and enacted by political leaders aiming to control communities of color and
ensure their subordination. Whether in campaigns or nationally televised speeches, the law and
order discourse enabled politicians to use racially coded language that tapped into deeply held
racial and ethnic biases by dominant groups in society. News media played a crucial role in this
regard by not only establishing “moral panics” but also in perpetuating negative stereotypes of
Latinx that persist today. In criminalizing specific groups, political rhetoric succeeded in shaping
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public opinion on crime, drugs and immigration; dramatically altering the American penal
system.
IV.

Enforcement and Interpretation: Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice System
While perceptions of Latinx as inherently criminal provide the justification for harsher

criminal justice policies, they also influence the ways in which those laws are then enforced and
interpreted. As mentioned, Latinx are overrepresented at every stage of the criminal justice
system and are continually subjected to racial and ethnic biases from actors within the system.
From practices of racial profiling by law enforcement agents, decisions regarding whom to
prosecute and what charges to file, racial and ethnic bias among jurors, sentencing and judicial
discretion, Latinx are often burdened by the cultural and ethnic stereotypes that assume they are
not law-abiding citizens or even lawfully present in the United States.
The drug war and the federal government’s policies on immigration have not only
exacerbated these perceptions, they have also incentivized law enforcement agencies to produce
results, i.e. narcotics, fire-arms, and undocumented migrants (Walker 2001). In addition to the
federal funding provided to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies for anti-drug
efforts, a considerable increase in funding has led to the establishment of several federal
institutions, initiatives and programs that rely on law enforcement tactics and strategies to
enforce immigration; arguably resulting in the widespread practice of racial profiling of Latinx
individuals (Gottschalk 2015).

Law Enforcement: Latinx as Drug Criminals and “Illegals”
At the earliest stage, the stage of arrest, decisions made by law enforcement officials
regarding what areas to target for crime and which individuals to stop for suspected criminal
activity often negatively impact Latinx and people of color in general. Minority communities are

27

targeted for greater surveillance and aggressive arrest policies by city police departments because
they are typically designated as “high crime” areas (Walker et al. 2004). Referencing a study
funded by the National Institute of Justice of the San Jose Police Department (SJPD) in
California, Walker et al. (2004: 58) note that a greater number of police officers are typically
assigned to areas with relatively high minority populations “because of the greater number of
calls for police service and reported crimes those areas.” At face value, it would seem that “high
crime” areas warrant greater police surveillance to ensure the safety of its residents and because
citizen calls for service necessitate patrol officers’ presence in those areas (Walker 2001).
However, the practice of patrolling “high crime” areas also exposes people of color to more
police attention, often yielding disproportionate rates of traffic stops and subsequent arrests.
Unlike direct calls to service, traffic stops are entirely discretionary, opening the door to potential
abuses of power and racial profiling (Walker 2001).
As Bender (2003, 8) points out, “Racial profiling by law enforcement authorities is based
on their perceptions of the criminality of racial and ethnic groups.” The practice of racial
profiling is commonly understood as the “detention, interdiction or other disparate treatment of
an individual [by police] solely on the basis of the racial or ethnic status of such individual”
(Mucchetti 2005, 2 citing West 2003). Officially, law enforcement agencies and government
officials have publicly condemned racial profiling. By 2003, more than twenty states had enacted
legislation prohibiting the practice and, under the Bush administration, the Department of Justice
released federal guidelines on racial profiling that expressly prohibited the practice for federal
law enforcement agencies, except in cases of national security (Banks 2003). It should be noted,
however, that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act had already prohibited law enforcement
agencies receiving federal funds to discriminate against individuals based on race or ethnicity,
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which, in theory, would include stop-search practices that used racial or ethnic markers to
identify suspected criminals (Feder 2012). In 2014, the Department of Justice updated the federal
guidelines on racial profiling and expressed a “commitment to ensuring that its law enforcement
agencies conduct their activities in an unbiased manner” (U.S. Department of Justice 2014). Yet
despite these efforts, countless studies reveal that the problem of racial profiling persists, either
explicitly or implicitly, and disproportionately affects Latinx and people of color generally. This
is particularly true in the wake of the drug war and anti-immigration legislation.
The pressure to increase drug arrests and convictions is evident in studies of racial
disparities in arrests and policing strategies. In the early 1990s, for example, an investigation
revealed that Latinx and African Americans constituted nearly 70 percent of the drivers stopped
on a portion of Interstate 95 in Florida although they only accounted for 5 percent of the drivers
in that particular county (Walker et al. 2004). In 2001, the Compendium of Federal Justice
Statistics reported that 38.1% of arrests made by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) by
September 2001 were of Latinx individuals – a rate three times higher than their proportion in
the general population, which was estimated at 12.5% in 2000 (Walker et al. 2004). In Louisiana,
the State Police Department used a training video that encouraged officers to use traffic stops to
search for narcotics. Specifically, officers were to stop “males of foreign nationalities, mainly
Cubans, Colombians, Puerto Ricans, or other swarthy outlanders” (Walker et al. 2004). In New
Jersey, a state trooper openly admitted to stopping Latino drivers, based on their ethnicity, and
charging them with driving while impaired. When asked why he stopped a particular driver, the
state trooper replied, “Because he’s Mexican;” adding that he suspected any Latinos driving
would likely be intoxicated (Walker et al. 2004). Whether officially encouraged through
department training videos or simply the result of individual bias, the use of racial and ethnic
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markers, such as skin color, language, and style of dress to identify suspected criminals is
extremely problematic and makes Latinx individuals particularly susceptible to law enforcement
practices that result in their overrepresentation in arrests.
While the above examples demonstrate explicit racial bias and the conscious use of
stereotypes as the basis for arresting suspected criminals, studies of implicit bias reveal that the
widespread and unconscious reliance on racial stereotypes also impact perceptions of crime,
disorder and danger (Walker et al. 2004). Two studies conducted in Seattle provide insight into
how implicit bias effects police practices in drug-enforcement efforts. The first study found that
law enforcement efforts focused almost exclusively on crack users, rather than drug users more
generally, resulting in the overrepresentation of African Americans and Latinx among those
arrested for drug possession (Beckett et al. 2005). The second study revealed that police tended
to focus their attention on mixed-race neighborhoods and outdoor venues, yielding higher arrest
rates for nonwhites (Beckett et al. 2006). The authors also noted a pervasive tendency of police
officers to overlook whites making drug deals. Although racial animus could not be ruled out as
a factor, the authors believed that this was more likely the result of implicit bias, as police
officers were “simply less likely to perceive whites who are involved in illicit drug activity as
drug offenders” (Beckett et al. 2006, 130). That Latinx are so easily identified as drug dealers
and users by police officers, despite evidence of relatively equal rates of consumption and
distribution with whites (Beckett et al. 2006), demonstrates that perception plays an important
role in determining how antidrug resources are used and who they target.
In addition to being perceived as drug dealers, the perception of Latinx as “illegals” has
made them particularly vulnerable to racial profiling tactics used to enforce immigration.
Although the war on drugs expanded grounds for the deportation of immigrants convicted of
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criminal offenses, anti-immigration legislation made immigration offenses criminal and subject
to incarceration or detention prior to removal. As mentioned, the merging of the criminal justice
system and immigration enforcement bureaucracies has indisputably led to an increase of Latinx
in the criminal justice system. By 2015, for example, the DHS had referred more cases to the
Justice Department for prosecution than all other major law enforcement agencies combined
(Gottschalk 2015). Programs like 287(g), CAP, and the Secure Communities program have been
crucial in this regard, subjecting Latinx to a higher risk of arrests through “proactive” policing
practices that include the pursuit of minor infractions. In addition, ethnic profiling at the border,
home and worksite raids, as well as joint initiatives of the DHS and Justice Department have
increased the arrest, incarceration, and deportation of Latinx.
As the federal government began to crack down on immigration enforcement, framed as
necessary measures to prevent terrorism, state and local law enforcement agencies supported
these efforts by entering into 287(g) agreements. Enacted as part of IIRIRA in 1996, Section
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act grants state and local authorities jurisdiction over
immigration offenses under formal agreement with the federal government. Though state and
local law enforcement have always played a role in immigration enforcement, either by
participating in immigration raids or by making immigration arrests without official authority
(Armenta 2017), the 287(g) program deputized state and local authorities as immigration
enforcement officials and essentially sanctioned problematic policing practices that continue to
disproportionately affect Latinx individuals.
In 2002, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement became the first law enforcement
agency to participate in the 287(g) program as part of its “counterterrorism strategy” (Armenta
2017). By 2011, there were sixty-eight state and local law enforcement agencies in 287(g)

31

agreements, spanning more than two dozen states (Gottschalk 2015). The program’s objective, as
stated by ICE officials, was to address serious crimes (Armenta 2017). In practice, however,
many local law enforcement agencies used their newfound authority to process suspected
immigrants for minor crimes.
Under the 287(g) program, Latinx communities have been routinely targeted by law
enforcement officials, resulting in civil rights abuses and their overrepresentation in the criminal
justice system. Armenta (2017, 32) cites Maricopa County, Arizona as “the most infamous
example,” stating that under Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the agency enlisted “over 160 deputies to
conduct immigration patrols, neighborhood sweeps, investigative police stops, raids on local
businesses, and immigration in the local jail.” Eventually, after a series of lawsuits alleging
various civil rights abuses, the DOJ conducted a three-year investigation of the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office and found that they had engaged in “a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
policing” (Armenta 2017, 32). The investigation found that Latinx were routinely racially
profiled; unlawfully stopped, detained, and arrested; and denied services as inmates in jail
(Armenta 2017). In other words, racial and ethnic markers such as brown skin, a foreign accent,
or being of visible “Latino or Mexican ancestry” were used as probable cause to justify an arrest
and mistreatment after the fact.
As more states entered into 287(g) agreements, new programs were established to
facilitate direct communication between state and local authorities and the federal government.
They also enhanced immigration screening tools and provided direct, round-the-clock access to
the DHS’s immigration database. As described by Gottschalk (2015), the first of these programs,
the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), was established in 2007 in an effort to consolidate the
several programs that immigration authorities had previously relied on to screen for “criminal
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aliens” in prisons and jails. Under CAP, ICE officials are notified by participating law
enforcement authorities when they have someone whom they suspect of being deportable in
custody. The detainees are then subject to an interview by ICE agents and can be placed on an
immigration hold, known as a “detainer,” if they are deemed potentially deportable (Gottschalk
2015). These detainers greatly increase the likelihood of more time spent in custody, as courts
are more likely to set higher bails or to deny bail altogether for defendants with detainers. As
noted by Gottschalk (2015), CAP provides police with an incentive to make an arrest in order to
check that individual’s immigration status, resulting in many Latinx being arrested and detained
for low-level misdemeanors that are not punishable by jail time.
The second program, the Secure Communities program, was established in 2008 and
quickly became “one of the most controversial weapons in the criminalization and localization of
immigration enforcement” (Gottschalk 2015, 228). The program provides police, jails, and other
booking facilities with access to the DHS’s immigration database to crosscheck fingerprints
when an arrest is made. In addition, all local, state, and federal law enforcement officers can
obtain immediate immigration status and identity information through access to ICE’s Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC) (Gottschalk 2015). Under the Secure Communities
program, anyone stopped – not just arrested or detained – can be subjected to an immediate
status check. Those found to be undocumented are immediately reported to ICE and subject to
detainers. Not surprisingly, the Secure Communities program, like CAP, has resulted in the
overpolicing of Latinx, typically for minor infractions. As Gottschalk (2015, 228) notes, “nearly
80 percent of the people deported through the Secure Communities program had no criminal
conviction or had been found guilty of only traffic violations or other minor offenses.”
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Studies conducted in New Jersey, Maryland, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Ohio,
New York, and Massachusetts reveal that Latinx are more likely to be stopped by police officers
for traffic violations than whites (Mucchetti 2005). In some states, county police regularly set up
roadblocks in areas with a high number of immigrants to check whether drivers have a valid
license, registration, and insurance (Gottschalk 2015). Because most states require proof of legal
residence in the United States to obtain a driver’s permit or license, driving without a license is a
common infraction among undocumented immigrants (Gottschalk 2015). Under programs like
CAP and Secure Communities, these minor infractions allow police to detain suspected
immigrants and immediately check their legal status. Even driving with a broken taillight could
trigger a status check if the officer chooses to do so. For Latinx, these traffic stops often result in
arrest. In Nashville, Tennessee, for example, while only 8 percent of all traffic stops resulted in
arrests in 2007, stops made on Latinx drivers led to arrest about 29 percent of the time (Armenta
2017). For state and local law enforcement officials, traffic stops are a relatively easy method to
police immigrants. In areas with a high population of Latinx, this inevitably leads to their
persecution, as they are often perceived as foreigners and easily identified by racial and ethnic
features.
Pretextual stops allow law enforcement agents to check the legal status of suspected
immigrants, but they are not the only method of immigration enforcement. ICE also conducts
home and worksite raids to search for deportable immigrants under the National Fugitive
Operations Program (NFOP) and the Worksite Enforcement Unit (WEU), respectively
(Gottschalk 2015). Under the NFOP, Fugitive Operations Teams (FOTs) are charged with
locating and removing dangerous fugitive immigrants, defined as anyone with a criminal history
or are otherwise deemed a threat to national security (Mendelson, Strom, and Wishnie 2009). In

34

practice, however, evidence suggests that the program is persecuting undocumented immigrants
indiscriminately. Based on ICE’s publicly released data on FOT criminal apprehensions from
2003 through February 2008, for example, Mendelson, Strom, and Wishnie (2009) noted that 73
percent of the individuals apprehended had no criminal conviction. Additionally, these home
raids are often carried out based on “grossly inaccurate” database information (Gottschalk 2015,
221).
Conversely, worksite raids target businesses suspected of employing undocumented
workers and have long been used by immigration enforcement officials to target Latinx. Before
its dissolution in 2003, for example, the INS regularly conducted worksite raids, explicitly using
ethnicity to guide its enforcement efforts (Walker et al. 2004). Though agents had denied using
this tactic, a review of 37 INS worksite raids in New York City, between 1997 and 1999,
revealed that agents frequently cited skin color, use of Spanish, and clothing as the primary
evidence of workers’ legal status (Walker et al. 2004). Not surprisingly then, nearly all of the
arrests made during these raids were of Latinx individuals (Walker et al. 2004).
Under ICE, the WEU began carrying out more high-profile worksite raids in 2006,
continuing the practice of primarily targeting undocumented workers rather than the businesses
and employers who knowingly hired them (Gottschalk 2015). Despite issuing new guidelines in
2009 that expressly shifted the focus to the criminal prosecution of employers, ICE reaffirmed its
commitment “to arrest and process for removal any illegal workers” encountered during worksite
raids (Gottschalk 2015). In fact, the data reflects that “illegal” workers continued to be the
primary target. In 2009, only thirteen employers in eight cases were prosecuted for hiring
undocumented workers, a felony offense, of the nearly 92,000 immigration-related prosecutions
conducted that year (Gottschalk 2015).
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As mentioned, federal law prohibits discrimination based on race and ethnicity, and DOJ
guidelines prohibit the use of racial or ethnic markers as probable cause to stop, question, or
detain individuals while conducting criminal investigations. Notably, however, CBP, a separate
entity under the DHS, cites a few exceptions in the CBP Policy on Nondiscrimination in Law
Enforcement Activities and all other Administered Programs. For example, according to the
agency’s policy, available on their website, “the consideration of race or ethnicity in law
enforcement, investigation, and screening activities,” is prohibited “in all but the most
exceptional circumstances” (emphasis added). The policy goes on to note that CBP personnel
may use race or ethnicity “when a compelling governmental interest is present and its use is
narrowly tailored to that interest,” such as in cases of national security. Moreover, the agency
distinguishes race and ethnicity from nationality, stating that nationality is “expressly relevant”
in anti-terrorism, customs, or immigration activities; and that the use of nationality to trigger
screening, inspection, or investigation in the administration or enforcement of a statute,
regulation, or executive order is “entirely appropriate and needs no further justification” (U.S.
Customs and Border Protection). Given the CBP’s broad jurisdiction and its propensity to
operate outside of it, the implications of these caveats for Latinx are significant.
In addition to operating along the border, at or between ports of entry, federal regulations
grant CBP officials authority to stop and conduct searches on vessels, trains, aircraft, or other
vehicles anywhere within one hundred miles of the border (see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) and 8
C.F.R. § 287.1(b)). As the ACLU notes, that area encompasses nine of the ten largest cities, the
entirety of ten states, and nearly two-thirds of the population; resulting in warrantless searches at
various immigration checkpoints. Moreover, investigations conducted by the ACLU found that
Border Patrol agents frequently ignore or misunderstand their geographical limitations while
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conducting individual stops, “resulting in violations of the constitutional rights of innocent
people,” (ACLU). According to a report put out by the New York Civil Liberties Union, an
investigation of transportation raids in New York revealed that traffic arrests frequently occur far
from the border, as well as an established pattern of misconduct by Border Patrol agents in
conducting these stops. Specifically, Border Patrol agents consistently targeted people of color
and frequently harassed Latinx citizens; opening their line of questioning with “What country are
you a citizen of?” and demanding proof of citizenship, which U.S. citizens are not required to
carry (Añon et al. 2011, 7). As a result, hundreds of arrests were made of lawfully present
individuals, while only 1 percent resulted in initiation of removal proceedings. Notably,
individuals from Latin America represented 73 percent of the arrestees (Añon et al. 2011).
Additional investigations reveal that Border Patrol agents often conduct generalized
criminal investigations, abandoning any pretext of immigration enforcement, which the Supreme
Court has declared unconstitutional. They have also been found to conduct invasive searches,
relying on false alerts by service canines to establish probable cause. The ACLU further suggests
that Border Patrol agents “collude with local law enforcement officials,” particularly in places
where anti-immigration legislation has led to widespread racial profiling. As demonstrated in
states like New York, these practices leave Latinx individuals uniquely vulnerable to civil rights
abuses, as investigations of legal status and criminal activity are often predicated on the
perception of them as “foreigners” and inherently criminal.
The above programs launched by ICE and Border Patrol, as well as their problematic
policing strategies, would likely not have been as effective if it were not for the cooperation of
state and local law enforcement agencies. While these programs have facilitated more direct
communication between agencies, the DHS and Department of Justice have also made their
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partnership more formal with joint initiatives such as Operation Streamline. Launched in 2005,
Operation Streamline employed a zero-tolerance policy toward unauthorized border-crossings
through the criminal prosecution of offenders (Nicholls 2013; Light, Lopez, and GonzalezBarrera 2014). Prior to 2005, immigrants apprehended at the border were largely released and
sent back to their country of origin, depending on their criminal history. Under Operation
Streamline, however, first-time offenders are charged with a misdemeanor that carries a
maximum six-month sentence. Previously deported migrants caught trying to re-enter the
country without authorization are then charged with felony reentry and sentenced to two years
before being deported again. The impact of this initiative on the number of Latinx convicted of
federal offenses has been catastrophic. As Gottschalk (2015, 223) notes, “Sentencing for felony
immigration crimes – which overwhelmingly involve instances of illegal border crossing, not
more serious crimes like human smuggling – accounted for nearly 90 percent of the rise in the
number of Hispanics sentenced to federal prison in the first decade of the twenty-first century.”
According a report released by the Pew Research Center in 2014, the number of
offenders sentenced in federal courts between 1992 and 2012 more than doubled, with the
increase in unlawful reentry convictions alone accounting for 48 percent of the growth (Light,
Lopez, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2014). With respect to the Latinx population specifically, the
numbers are no less striking. In 1992, Latinx made up 23 percent of sentenced offenders and by
2012, they represented the single largest racial/ethnic group at 48 percent. Over the same period,
the number of offenders who were not U.S. citizens increased from 22 percent to 46 percent.
Among federal sentenced offenders in 1992, 12 percent were unauthorized immigrants,
increasing to 40 percent by 2012. Federal convictions of immigration crimes made up 30 percent
of offenders in 2012, the second largest group after drug convictions. By contrast, immigration
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offenses made up only 5 percent of federal convictions in 1992 (Light, Lopez, and GonzalezBarrera 2014). By yearend 2015, 95 percent of all prisoners sentenced for immigration offenses
in federal prison were Latinx (Carson and Anderson 2016).
Despite the above initiatives and programs, federal and state efforts to identify, detain,
and deport immigrants show no sign of slowing down. In 2010, a law passed in Arizona
authorized local police to check the immigration status of anyone arrested or detained if there
was a “reasonable suspicion” that they were in the country illegally (Pew Research Center 2010).
Not surprisingly, Latinx represented 30 percent of the population in Arizona in 2008, of which
33 percent were foreign born (Pew Research Center 2010). While Latin Americans have not
been the only targets of anti-immigration policies, proximity and volume help explain why they
are targeted so routinely.

Interpretation of the Law: Judicial Rulings, Sentencing, and Prosecutorial Discretion
While the practice of racial and ethnic profiling is prohibited, court rulings on the matter
have been widely inconsistent, particularly in cases of drug and immigration arrests. Not only
have they set precedents for exceptions and loose interpretations, but they have also set the
standard of proof extremely high, making it difficult to successfully challenge instances of racial
profiling. More importantly, however, they reveal that judges can also be influenced by their
own perceptions of crime, and which groups of people are more likely to commit crimes, when
making decisions. As noted by Provine (2007), judges are a part of the “symbiotic relationship”
that exists between political order and public opinion. As such, they are not impervious to the
cultural perception of Latinx as “illegals” and prone to criminal behavior.
Cases that challenge racial profiling practices typically invoke Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth Amendment grants
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citizens protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that warrants issued for arrest,
search, or seizure must be based on probable cause. In Terry v. Ohio (1968), however, the
Supreme Court ruled that police officers may conduct warrantless searches and seizures “where
swift action based upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required” (392
U. S. 20). Terry employed a “totality of circumstances” test to determine the reasonableness of
police investigatory stops; finding that “reasonable, articulable suspicion was sufficient grounds
for a police officer to stop and question a citizen” (Feder 2012). Under Terry, police officers are
generally allowed to “stop and frisk” an individual in search for weapons or evidence of criminal
activity, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be
committed. Such suspicion must be particularized and based on the specific circumstances; it
cannot, for example, be based merely on a police officer’s “hunch” (Feder 2012). Terry would
also lay the foundation for pretextual traffic stops.
On the question of race as a factor in determining reasonable suspicion, however, two
Supreme Court rulings are particularly illuminating when it comes to how Latinx are perceived
by others and how this perception often leads to legally-sanctioned mistreatment by police
officers and federal agents. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), the Supreme Court found
that “the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent’s car: the apparent
Mexican ancestry of the occupants” (Feder 2002, 2). In this case, the officer’s belief that the
occupants of the car were “illegal aliens” did not satisfy the constitutional minimum for an
investigatory stop (Feder 2002). However, the Court revealed its own bias when it stated that,
“[t]he likelihood that any person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor” (Feder 2002, 2). Such language would later provide
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justification for immigration enforcement agencies to, at least partially, rely on race as a factor in
determining suspicion, as in the case of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976).
In Martinez-Fuerte, Border Patrol agents had been selectively referring motorists to a
secondary inspection area based on several factors, including apparent Mexican ancestry (Feder
2002). Here, the Supreme Court ruled that such referrals were not unconstitutional, citing the
relevance of nationality given that roughly 20 percent of the vehicles referred for secondary
inspection over the period in question included unauthorized immigrants (Feder 2002). Notably,
in Brennan’s dissenting opinion, joined by Marshall, he argued: “That law in this country should
tolerate use of one’s ancestry as probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any
circumstances” (cited in Alschuler 2002, 165). Ultimately, the majority opinion held that
“Border Patrol officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted” (cited
in Alschuler 2002, 175).
Complicating matters further, pretextual stops in search for drugs have also been
sanctioned by the courts. In Whren v. United States (1996), defendants were charged with drug
offenses after they were pulled over by cops for minor traffic infractions (Feder 2002). The
defendants, who were African American, argued that they were the victims of racial profiling,
claiming that they would not have been pulled over had they been White. The Court agreed that
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations of race is prohibited under the
Constitution, however, “the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis” (cited in
Alschuler 2002, 193 and Feder 2012, 6). In maintaining that claims of racial discrimination can
only be brought under Fourteenth Amendment violations, the Court declared pretextual traffic
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stops constitutionally legal as long as there was an objective, nonracially motivated basis for the
stop, such as a traffic violation. As noted by Alschuler (2002, 165), “Whren’s separation of the
Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause prevents courts from weighing all of the
interests impaired by a police action against all of the justifications asserted for it.”
The Fourteenth Amendment of U.S. Constitution grants that, “[n]o state shall … deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV
cited in Feder 2012, 4). In addition, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process to
individuals in their dealings with the federal government has also been interpreted to include the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause (Feder 2012). Under the Equal Protection
Clause, claims of racial profiling may be challenged if there is clear proof of racial animus
and/or selective enforcement of the law (Feder 2012). In other words, claimants may argue that
an officer’s conduct was racially motivated, thus, violating the Equal Protection Clause; or that
they were the victims of selective enforcement (Feder 2012).
Essential to any equal protection claim is proof of discriminatory intent (Feder 2012). In
practice, courts have required claimants to provide statistical evidence of racially discriminatory
practices unless a law or policy “contains an express racial classification” (Feder 2012, 4 citing
Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329). That is, absent of direct evidence of racial animus in
police motivation, or an overtly discriminatory policy, claimants must show that similarly
situated individuals of a different race were treated differently (Feder 2012; Alschuler 2002). In
cases of drug and immigration enforcement, these requirements pose evidentiary burdens on
defendants claiming racial discrimination.
For example, in United States v. Armstrong (1996), the Supreme Court rejected the
criminal defendants’ claim that they were victims of selective prosecution based on race ruling
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that there was no statistical evidence to show that similarly situated Whites were not prosecuted.
The defendants in this case provided preliminary evidence of racial discrimination in crack
cocaine offense prosecutions in the federal district courts of Los Angeles and sought an order
requiring the United States Attorney’s office to provide information about the races of crack
defendants prosecuted to support their claim (Alschuler 2002). The Court held that the
defendants were not entitled to this discovery, noting that their “study failed to identify
individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which
respondents charged” (517 U.S. at 470 cited in Alschuler 2002, 203). Subsequent rulings have
cited Armstrong in rejecting similar claims, while others have contended that even if racial
animus is evident, it is not enough to constitute an Equal Protection Clause violation if it is not
the sole factor.
In the case of United States v. Valenzuela (2001), a Latino motorist was stopped by a
Colorado trooper for weaving in traffic. The trooper suspected that the driver might be a drug
courier because, among other reasons cited, the driver was traveling from Tucson, which was a
known source of illegal drugs (Feder 2012). Upon receiving consent from the driver to search the
vehicle, the trooper found large amounts of cocaine and arrested the driver (Feder 2012). The
officer later testified that he relied on information provided by the DEA – that the majority of
drug smugglers in the area were Latinx – when making probable cause determinations (Feder
2012). Though evidence was provided of a significant number of Latinx arrestees, the district
court denied the defendant’s motions to suppress because there was “no persuasive evidence that
the Trooper targeted any of these suspects solely because of their race” (emphasis added) (Feder
2012, 5 citing United States v. Valenzuela 2001).
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The above rulings demonstrate the difficulty of challenging practices of racial profiling as
violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. Moreover, they reveal that racial
discrimination in criminal justice is not limited to law enforcement practices, but also in
prosecutorial and judiciary decision making. Most importantly, however, they reveal that judges
are also impacted by their own perceptions of criminality when it comes to Latinx defendants, as
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. While judges are often viewed as impartial interpreters of
the law, they are clearly not immune to the cultural stereotypes that often subject Latinx to unjust
legal treatment. In fact, evidence suggests that beliefs in negative stereotypes can also inform
judges’ decisions on sentencing; arguably the most important stage of the criminal justice system
(Walker et al. 2004).
In their 2014 report, Racial Disparities on Sentencing, the ACLU asserted that Black and
Latinx offenders “sentenced in state and federal courts face significantly greater odds of
incarceration than similarly situated white offenders and receive longer sentences than their
white counterparts in some jurisdictions.” While this is due, in large part, to the mandatory
minimums set in drug offense convictions and truth-in-sentencing programs, studies show that
judges often impose harsher sentences on non-U.S. citizens and people of color in general
(Albonetti 1997). For example, Morín (2009) references a study done in 2001 in which the
sentencing practices in Pennsylvania revealed that Latinx are “vulnerable to harsher penalties
because of the prevalence of negative stereotypes and biases that associate Latino/as with illegal
drugs activities, low intelligence, and the rise in neighborhood crime.” With statements from
judges such as,
We shouldn’t kid ourselves. I have always prided myself for not being prejudiced
but it is hard not to be affected by what is taking place. The whole area has changed
with the influx of Hispanics and especially Puerto Ricans. You’d hardly recognize
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the downtown from what it was a few years ago. There’s more dope, more crime,
more people on welfare, more problems in school (Morín 2009, 27),
it seems highly unlikely that these beliefs would not affect their ability to remain impartial when
sentencing a Latinx person convicted of a crime. This judge’s stated “experience” with Puerto
Ricans, merely a reflection of the collective discourse on Latinx, is what will undoubtedly inform
his decision on sentencing.
Additional court rulings regarding sentencing show that a defendant’s legal status can
also have a direct, negative impact on the sentence they receive. For example, when deliberating
on sentencing, the trial judge in U.S. v. Onwuemene (1991) stated,
You are not a citizen of this country. This country was good enough to allow you
to come in here and to confer upon you . . . a number of the benefits of this society,
form of government, and its opportunities, and you repay that kindness by
committing a crime like this. We have enough criminals in the United States
without importing any (Logue 2009, 427)
The appellate court in this case ruled that consideration of the defendant’s citizenship status was
a violation of his constitutional rights. As such, they vacated the sentence and ordered the district
court to resentence him “in a manner consistent with its opinion” (Logue 2009, 427).
In U.S. v. Borrero-Isaza (1989), the trial judge imposed a harsher sentence on the
appellant relative to his white codefendant in a drug trafficking case (Logue 2009). In explaining
his rationale, “the judge repeatedly referenced the appellant’s country of origin (Colombia),
which is highlighted as a drug source country” (Logue 2009, 427). As in U.S. v. Onwuemene, the
appellate court held that the judge’s actions constituted a violation of the appellant’s right to due
process and ordered the district court to resentence him (Logue 2009).
While sentencing guidelines such as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 have been put in
place to neutralize the effects of such biases, studies show that in practice, judges can circumvent
these guidelines and will often impose harsher sentences on non-U.S. citizens and people of
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color when they do (Albonetti 1997). Under the Sentencing Reform Act, gender, ethnicity,
education, and citizenship status are all legally defined as irrelevant. However, a study conducted
in 1997 revealed that even when guidelines are followed, “defendant’s gender, ethnicity,
education, and citizenship status exert significant direct effects on sentence outcomes when
guideline-defined legally relevant variables and processing variables are controlled for,”
(Albonetti 1997, 817). Consistent with these findings, Walker et al. (2004) note that the average
length of time that immigrants were in detention increased from 4.6 months in 1991 to 15.1
months in 1997.
As seen in the above examples, judges play a significant role in contributing to
sentencing disparities. They can be, and often are, influenced by their own prejudices when
presiding over criminal cases involving Latinx defendants. While the Sentencing Reform Act
may have reduced the amount of leeway afforded to judges in sentencing, it has not diminished
their discretionary authority entirely. It did, however, extend this discretionary authority to
prosecuting attorneys.
Under the federal guidelines, prosecuting attorneys were given much more authority over
the sentencing process, potentially undermining the overall goal of the guidelines (Albonetti
1997). Additionally, like judges, prosecuting attorneys can circumvent the guideline-defined
sentence through charging and guilty plea negotiations, as well as motions for a sentence
departure (Albonetti 1997). Given prosecutorial control over charging and plea negotiations,
knowing which sentences are attached to each charge, prosecuting attorneys have an immense
amount of power over who gets sent to prison. Statistical evidence suggests that this tends to
negatively affect Latinx and people of color in general. For example, according to the U.S.
Department of Justice, 84 percent of the persons referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for drug
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offenses in 1999 were prosecuted, with suspects involved in marijuana and/or opiate cases
among those most likely to be charged and sentenced – a significant number of whom were
Latinx (Walker et al. 2004).
As scholars have pointed out, fewer studies have been conducted to test the influence of
race on charges brought against defendants relative to racial discrimination in law enforcement
(Albonetti 1997; Mauer 2011; Sommers and Marotta 2014). This is partially due to the fact that
more than 90 percent of guilty verdicts are a result of plea bargains, rather than jury verdicts, and
because most of these plea bargains happen “behind closed doors” (Mauer 2011, 92S). While it
may be difficult to ascertain whether racial discrimination is happening at the prosecutorial level,
available data that suggests that it is. In 1991, for example, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
conducted a study of federal mandatory sentencing and found that prosecutors were more likely
to offer negotiated plea deals to White defendants than African American or Latinx defendants in
cases that would have carried a mandatory minimum otherwise (Mauer 2011). In addition,
prosecutors are more likely to charge and try Latinx juvenile offenders as adults. As Walker et al.
(2004) point out, Latinx youth were 6.2 times more likely than White youth to be prosecuted as
adults between 1996 and 1998. Additional studies suggest that prosecutors make decisions
regarding which charges are worth pursuing based on the likelihood of conviction at trial, taking
into consideration how juries are likely to assess a particular defendant (Sommers and Marotta
2014).
That Latinx face consistent patterns of racial and ethnic bias at every level of the criminal
justice system is evident in rates of arrest, the likelihood that they will be over-charged or are
less likely to be given a plea deal that carries a less punitive sentence, and the fact that they are
more likely to be deemed as deserving of harsher sentences by judges, based on their perceived
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criminality or their legal status. While cultural stereotypes have often been invoked to garner
support for laws that further marginalize Latinx, it is the belief or acceptance of those stereotypes
as inherent truths, either consciously or unconsciously, by actors within the criminal justice
system that make those laws so dangerous. Moreover, as society is made up of more than just
political and legal actors, the use of and belief in cultural stereotypes continues to shape the
treatment of Latinx even outside of legal institutions.

V.

Non-Legal Institutions: Latinx Youth as ‘Unintelligent Criminals’
While the wars on crime, drugs, and terror resulted in laws that drastically expanded the

American penal system, the nation’s turn toward punitiveness was not limited to the criminal
justice system, nor did it only target adults of color. Politicians and public officials tackled
education reform with the same fervor that they approached criminal justice. By the early 1990s,
a significant number of schools across the nation had adopted zero-tolerance policies that were
aimed at drugs, weapons, school disruptions and other minor infractions (Verdugo 2002). Such
policies have contributed to the disproportionality of school discipline that overwhelmingly
affects African American and Latinx students. For example, as Skiba et al. (2011, 86) point out,
“students of color have been found to be suspended at rates two to three times that of other
students, and similarly overrepresented in office referrals, corporal punishment, and school
expulsion.” Moreover, zero-tolerance policies have brought the justice system directly into
schools with the presence of police officers patrolling the hallways. This convergence between
the education and legal systems has led to what is now commonly referred to as the “school to
prison pipeline” (Heitzeg 2014 citing Advancement Project 2005; Children’s Defense Fund
2007; NAACP 2005); where “youth of color in particular are at increased risk for being ‘pushed
out’ of schools – pushed out into the streets, into the juvenile justice system, and/or into adult
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prisons and jails” (Heitzeg 2014).
While noting that the school to prison pipeline is “most immediately related to zero
tolerance policies, their police-based enforcement, and to failing schools that are overcrowded,
inadequately resourced, and highly segregated,” Heitzeg (2014, 12) argues that “it is also the
result of larger social and political trends. The school to prison pipeline is consistent with mediadriven fears of crime and ‘super-predators,’ an increasingly harsh legal system for both juveniles
and adults, and the rise of the prison industrial complex.” As they had during the drug war,
political rhetoric and news media contributed to a moral panic around gang violence, focusing
almost exclusively on African American and Latinx gangs (Heitzeg 2014). The constant
attention on youth of color as violent “super-predators,” both in the media and among policy
makers, reinforced stereotypes of them as dangerous criminals deserving of harsh punishments.
Punitive legislation soon followed.
Congress enacted the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act (GFSA) in 1994 as a direct response
to school shootings and the perceived surge in teen violence. As a result of the super-predators
discourse, the GFSA was only the beginning of punitive policies in schools. The 1996 Violent
Youth Predator Act created mandatory minimum sentences for youth convicted of violent crimes
and lowered the minimum age for trying juveniles as adults from 16 to 14 years of age (Mora
and Christianakis 2013). Similarly, Proposition 21: The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime
Prevention Act of 1998 in California called on harsher punishments for youth crimes associated
with gang-related activity and gave prosecutors more discretionary power to try juveniles as
adults (Mora et al., 2012).
Although the number of youths committed to juvenile facilities has steadily declined
since its peak in 1999, the fact remains that youth of color are more likely to enter the justice

49

system than their white counterparts and at a significantly higher frequency (Rovner 2016).
Latinx youth in particular are 61 percent more likely than white youth to be in placement
(Rovner 2016). Important to note is that most committed juveniles have been adjudicated on
nonviolent offenses. In 2003, 76 percent of all committed juveniles were held for nonviolent
offenses and in 2013 that number had barely declined to 74 percent (Rovner 2016).
As Heitzeg (2014) argues, the acceptance of negative stereotypes impacts the daily
interactions that youth of color have in social settings, particularly with their teachers, school
administrators, and the police officers that patrol their schools. Perceived as criminals in the
making with a propensity towards violence, teachers and school administrators can be quick to
see students of color as oppositional, disruptive, and disrespectful. Punishments for youth of
color are swift and often more severe, with minor infractions leading to suspension or expulsion
at best or reported to the police at worst (Heitzeg 2014).
In an ethnographic study of a predominantly minority, urban school, Morris (2005) found
that many of the adults perceived the African American and Latino boys as particularly “bad”
and occasionally threatening. School officials considered many of the Latino boys “dangerous
and subjected them to constant surveillance and bodily discipline” (Morris 2005: page number of
quote). Students suspected of being gang-affiliated, often based on their clothing, hairstyle, and
response to authority, were disciplined accordingly and almost always Latino (Morris 2005).
Although many of the students resisted the dress code and refused to “tuck in their shirt,” the
Latino boys were viewed as especially threatening and oppositional in their resistance (Morris
2005). One teacher commented that, “The gang influence is bad among these Hispanics,” while
other teachers expressed similar views and thought of the Latino boys as untrustworthy (Morris
2005: page number of quote).
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Morris (2005, 37) describes a particularly revealing exchange during an interview with a
white fourth-year teacher, in which she was asked how she identified gang members:
‘Like if one of my Hispanic boys is wearing all blue – blue shirt and blue pants.
The Crips, they wear blue rag.’ Many students, irrespective of race or gender, wore
blue clothing at Matthews, occasionally all blue. Yet Ms. McCain implied that she
interprets such clothing to indicate gang membership only when worn by Latino
boys. The combination of race and gender with dress in this case could signal the
difference between a potentially dangerous student and a harmless one.
That the Latino boys in this school were easily identified as gang members, despite
similar styles of dress with other students, signifies an acceptance of the notion that they
are inherently criminal among many of the teachers.
While there is no doubt that the shift towards zero-tolerance policies in schools and the
school to prison pipeline have perpetuated the criminalization of Latinx, there are other barriers
to educational attainment that Latinx are forced to contend with. Many of these barriers are a
result of anti-immigrant sentiments and the perpetuation and acceptance of cultural stereotypes.
At a policy level, this is best exemplified by the legislative changes that occurred in the 1990s in
California. While the previously-mentioned Proposition 187 sought to deny undocumented
children the right to public education, it was soon followed by the “California Civil Rights
Initiative” of 1996, and the “English for Children” initiative of 1998, Propositions 209 and 227
respectively. Proposition 209 effectively ended the use of affirmative action in education and
state hiring and promotion practices, while Proposition 227 eliminated bilingual education from
California public schools.
The fact that 1.3 million schoolchildren were non-English speakers was further proof that
Latinx were unwilling or unable to assimilate (Santa Ana 2002; Bender 2003). Senator Alan
Simpson, for example, observed that “[t]he assimilation of the English language and other
aspects of American culture by Spanish-speaking immigrants appears to be less rapid and
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complete than for other groups” (Bender 2003, 82). Pat Buchanan, a former presidential
candidate, instilled fear by suggesting that Mexican Americans were creating their own nation,
just as Cubans had:
Unlike the immigrants of old, who bade farewell to their native lands when they
boarded the ship, for Mexicans, the mother country is right next door. Millions
have no desire to learn English or to become citizens. America is not their home;
Mexico is; and they wish to remain proud Mexicans. They have [only] come here
to work. Rather than assimilate, they create Little Tijuanas in U.S. cities, just as
Cubans have created a Little Havana in Miami . . . With their radio and TV
stations, newspapers, films, and magazines, the Mexican Americans are creating a
Hispanic culture separate and apart from America’s larger culture. They are
becoming a nation within a nation. (Bender 2003, 82)
While Simpson’s remarks imply an inability to assimilate, Buchanan implies that Mexican
Americans and Cubans are unwilling to assimilate and thus, unpatriotic. The connection of
Proposition 209 to stereotypes is less obvious but no less damaging. Affirmative action practices,
particularly in education, were seen as unfair to white applicants by “giving preference in the
admissions process to the stereotypical unintelligent Latina/o (and African Americans),” (Bender
2003, 5). Laws such as these reinforce discriminatory practices in education and have real
consequences for Latinx students.
The perception of Latinx as unintelligent or unable to learn English is yet another barrier
to educational attainment for Latinx youth. Reardon and Galindo (2003) for example, found that
teachers were more likely to rate Latinx students entering kindergarten lower than white
students, regardless of their academic ability (cited in Schneider, Martinez, and Owens 2006).
The study indicated that these initial findings were likely based on the student’s ethnicity alone
and that such biases set the stage for lower expectations for and underperformance by Latinx
students (Schneider, Martinez, and Owens 2006). In fact, additional studies that focused on
student-teacher relationships found that teachers who exhibit negative attitudes toward minority
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students directly impact their educational outcomes, as the students no longer view the teacher as
a credible source of information (Schneider, Martinez, and Owens 2006 citing Payne 1994 and
Valenzuela 1999).
The fact is that Latinx youth are far behind any other racial or ethnic group in terms of
educational attainment. In 2017, for example, the percentage of Latinx 25 years and older with a
bachelor’s degree in the United States was only 12.2, compared with 23.8% of whites, 15.1% of
blacks, and 30.5% of Asian Americans (U.S. Census 2017). Although high school dropout rates
for Latinx have declined considerably from 2006 to 2017, 21 to 8.2 percent respectively, it still
remains much higher than that of African Americans (6.5 percent) and white students (4.3
percent) (National Center for Education Statistics 2019). While there are plenty of other factors
that contribute to educational attainment for Latinx, such as neighborhood segregation,
overcrowding and underfunding to name a few, societal perceptions of Latinx youth as
unintelligent and criminally inclined play a significant role as well.

VI.

Conclusion: The Legacy of the War on Drugs and Crimmigration on Latinx
Whether they are being described by politicians as dangerous criminals and a burden on

taxpayers, or are overrepresented in news stories depicting violent crimes, Latinx are forced to
contend with the racial and ethnic stereotypes that have served to justify their subjugation by
those in positions of power and their subsequent mistreatment by society. Legally, the Greaser
Act was an early example of how law has been used to dehumanize and criminalize Latinx, but
as the country moved towards a less openly racist rhetoric, politicians and public officials
employed more subtle tactics to continue using the law to subordinate people of color. As the
nation became “colorblind,” it also became more punitive; and crime, which had long been
synonymous with color, became the primary talking point for elected officials. Though crime
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had been on the decline, and most Americans were not too concerned with either crime or drug
use, public officials warned of the “street crime” and “hoodlums” that posed a danger to society
and American values. Images of violent criminals and drug addicts, all of color, flooded the
media, convincing the American public that crime and drugs were serious issues that needed to
be addressed with more punitive measures. Later, terrorism would pose a similar, if not more
dangerous threat to the nation, and “illegal aliens” would become the new criminals in need of
being locked away. Though Latinx, arguably, were not the primary targets of either the drug war
or the war on terror, the historical perception of Latinx groups as less intelligent, unwilling or
incapable of assimilating, narco-terrorists, perpetual foreigners and inherently criminal made
them vulnerable to the punitive policies that came out of the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s.
Though political figures were the driving force behind these changes, they relied heavily
on the media to transmit their message. In 2002, the National Association of Hispanic Journalists
reported that 66 percent of network news stories about Latinx focused exclusively on crime,
terrorism and illegal immigration (Morín 2009). Lou Dobbs, in particular, has falsely reported on
the number of foreigners in federal custody in the past, reinforcing the misperception that
immigrants are more likely to commit crimes (Morín 2009). These myths and stereotypes about
immigrants and crime, as Rumbaut et al. (2006) point out, “provide the underpinnings for public
policies and practices and shape public opinion and political behavior” (cited in Morín 2009, 32).
The overrepresentation of Latinx in news stories regarding crime can and does shape the way
they are perceived by society – often as criminals and illegals.
When Donald Trump declared that all Mexicans were rapists, drug dealers, and criminals
in 2015, he was only reiterating a narrative that had been created centuries earlier. As with
Wilson back in the 1990s, Trump’s xenophobic message hit home for people who were
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economically frustrated and needed someone to blame. In employing the stereotypes of
Mexicans as innately criminal, Trump succeeded in scapegoating Latinx for all that is wrong
with the America of today. The fact that this narrative has been proven to be effective throughout
America’s history implies that these beliefs are deeply embedded in our culture. Understanding
how Latinx are perceived on a cultural level informs our understanding of how certain laws are
shaped around those perceptions. Support for and implementation of punitive policies on the
basis of negative stereotypes has contributed significantly to the mass incarceration epidemic
plaguing the United States.
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